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25 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: EOI

1. Carl Duckett's response to Colonel White's inquiry about
EOI management and organization strikes me as one possible
solution but I do not think the arrangement he discusses is one
which offers the best chances for the Agency and the Community
to meet the large challenge posed by the advent of a near-real-time
reconnaissance system.

2. The comparison of EOI and its management with ⬚
and HEXAGON is curious. There is no question that ⬚ H required
great technical competence and a high degree of managerial expertise,
but in the final analysis both systems will provide more data of a
type with which we are already familiar. Hence, the impact of ⬚
and H will be essentially quantitative. The impact of these systems,
unlike EOI, will not lead to revolutionary changes in Agency or
Community organization or processes.

3. The manner in which we gear up to deal with an EOI system
is critical. EOI impact will pervade all aspects of Agency work.
It will be most important to guarantee technical success of the
collection phase of this project. It is equally important, if not
more important, to insure that generalists, as well as technicians,
are deeply involved in decision-making every step of the way.
This means the production components must be far more involved
than they have been to date.

4. Carl speaks of the good work being done by Charlie Roth.
Roth is a fine technician and is performing well, but the kinds of
issues that loom before us with regard to such far-ranging matters

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as space facilities for exploiters, processing facilities for data
converters, and the structure of Agency and Community organizations
is going to require a great deal more input than can be provided by
a technician like Roth, or for that matter, by any one Deputy in
the Agency.

5. EOI strikes me as being somewhat akin to the U-2 project
in its earliest stages when Bissell as SAPC took control of the
project. He was granted special priorities and authorities and
very carefully laid plans in an orderly way to deal with all aspects
relating to U-2 impact, including targeting, requirements, PI
exploitation, film processing, support arrangements, policy approval
procedures, relationships with US commands abroad and with foreign
allies, etc. In a fairly short time, while the U-2 was undergoing its
rapid development, the Agency (and the Community through the
old ad hoc Requirements Committee) was being carefully prepared
for the results. The results were revolutionary; the U-2 led to
SAMOS, CORONA, GAMBIT and all the new advance systems and
to national assets like NPIC, COMOR, and the NRO. It may be
more comfortable to do as Carl suggests -- that is, to leave EOI
as the responsibility of one Deputy Director who would be charged
with solving problems through direct relationships with other
Deputies and Community leaders. The problem is that no single
Deputy in this Agency has the kind of time* which EOI deserves.
It can be argued that EOI calls for a special authority at O/DCI
level to orchestrate the effort -- technical, organizational, and
procedural -- inside and outside the Agency.

6. I am glad that Carl sees the need for Community contributions
to the staff of the EOI project. No one should be under any illusion,
however, that those military officers seconded to the project will be
allowed to make decisions which will be binding on the way in which
DOD operates in the EOI environment. Already within DOD a great
deal of planning and skullwork is taking place looking to the ways
in which DOD headquarters and commands abroad will deal with this
product. One aspect not dealt with in Carl's paper which is of

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* There is also a question of willingness to commit resources. The
DD/I, for example, has designated no one to riderherd on EOI and this
could well be a full-time activity for a senior and savvy DD/I officer.
The DD/S may be willing to staff for EOI but is having trouble keeping
informed and consulted.

considerable importance is how to arrange for Agency and Community review of EOI work. There is no easy solution to this, though Agency review, I believe, would be enhanced by placing project management at O/DCI level. As for Community review, whether this is done under USIB auspices or otherwise is something which must be thought through.

7. Successful development of EOI and of all the plans necessary to be ready for its advent requires that the Agency's top leadership become more vigorous and active and questioning with regard to the progress of EOI work. For starters, I believe Colonel White should hear out the details of what it is Carl proposes, obtain Carl's views on the capabilities of the Agency to make good on this very serious charge when it is known that our expertise is in short supply and to insist on generation of alternate arrangements which might be considered.

8. In this respect I think the timing to accomplish this is growing short. Last summer and last fall we were all told to wait until January before getting concerned about what next. Carl's paper now tells us to wait until August. As time passes, our flexibility diminishes.

9. In summary, I think Carl's paper is a reasonable and logical exposition, but it is valid only if one assumes that EOI is just another Agency project which fits easily and niftily into one Directorate and that the Agency is unwilling to invest the necessary resources which would be involved in setting up a central EOI staff at O/DCI level. We need the strongest and most sophisticated kind of orchestrated effort to ready ourselves for EOI's arrival.

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